The Obligation of Amr

The requirement of amr, on the view of the majority, is wujūb. It is not merely recommended to act upon, as Abū Hāshim and the Muʿtazilah held; nor merely permissible, as Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. Surayj of the Shāfiʿīs held; nor do the Aḥnāf disregard it, as some have alleged.

Those who hold that to act upon amr is mandūb argue that amr is for ṭalab (demand or request), so the addressee must attempt the action; the minimum that follows, on this view, is recommendation. They cite the saying of Allāh ﴿فكاتبوهم إن علمتم فيهم خيرا﴾¹, "give them such writing if you know that they are good and trustworthy", which they read as a recommendation to draw up a contract when a slave seeks freedom for a fixed sum.

Those who hold that to act upon amr is mubāḥ say that ṭalab here means the addressees are authorised to perform the action and that it is not ḥarām; the minimum that follows is permissibility. They cite ﴿فاصطادوا﴾², "then hunt", which they read as the permission to hunt once one has come out of iḥrām.

Those who allege that the Aḥnāf do not act upon amr, and instead investigate other avenues, say that amr is of many types (some have identified sixteen), so that without an established context the command cannot be acted upon. On the Ḥanafī view, amr is wājib and does not in reality have a competing default. If a context is established, it is taken into account.

Sixteen Types of Amr

This stands in answer to the companions of Imām al-Shāfiʿī, who hold that an amr following a prohibition is given to indicate permissibility, while an amr before the prohibition was for compulsion: as in ﴿وإذا حللتم فاصطادوا﴾³, that when you come out of iḥrām you may hunt; that is, hunting becomes permissible after iḥrām, having been forbidden in it. The Aḥnāf hold that amr retains its sense of compulsion even after a prohibition, as in ﴿فإذا انسلخ الأشهر الحرم فاقتلوا المشركين حيث وجدتموهم﴾⁴: when the sacred months have passed it becomes wājib to fight the polytheists wherever they are found, unless they repent. The permissibility in ﴿وإذا حللتم فاصطادوا﴾ (Sūrat al-Māʾidah 5:2) is not derived from the amr itself but from ﴿أحل لكم الطيبات﴾ (Sūrat al-Māʾidah 5:5), that on that day good foods have been made lawful. The command to hunt addresses those for whom hunting is beneficial; making it compulsory would impose an unwarranted burden.

The Aḥnāf hold that the requirement of amr is wujūb, since the one commanded has no choice as to whether he should act on the command. Allāh says ﴿وما كان لمؤمن ولا مؤمنة إذا قضى الله ورسوله امرا ان يكون لهم الخيرة من أمرهم﴾⁵, that it is not for a believing man or a believing woman, when Allāh and His messenger have decided a matter, to have any choice in their affair. When Allāh and His messenger issue a ruling through a command, the believer has no discretion as to acceptance; obedience is required. The text adduced for the same conclusion is also ﴿ما منعك ألا تسجد إذ أمرتك﴾⁶, where Allāh addressed Iblīs: "what prevented you from prostrating when I commanded you?", that is, what choice remained for you after the command came, that you did not prostrate? This shows that following the command of Allāh and His messenger is wājib.

The Aḥnāf hold that amr is wājib because the one commanded has no discretion, and because they recognise the threat of waʿīd that attends abandonment of the command. Allāh says ﴿فليحذر الذين يخالفون عن أمره أن تصيبهم فتنة او يصيبهم عذاب أليم﴾⁷: let those beware who dissent from the messenger's order, lest some trial befall them in this world or a painful punishment in the next. Such waʿīd attaches only to the abandonment of a wājib command.

Consensus testifies that the indication of amr is wujūb; all are agreed that an action sought from another can only be sought through a command. Amr admits no original ambiguity. The people of logic are added because if a master orders his slave to perform a command and the slave fails to do so, the slave has earned punishment; and if amr were not for wujūb, there would be no ground on which the slave deserved it.

Sometimes an amr does not imply wujūb, but indicates ibāḥah (permissibility) or nadb (recommendation). Two views obtain on whether amr implies ibāḥah and nadb intrinsically.

The first view is that ibāḥah and nadb are implied by amr ḥaqīqatan (intrinsically), as parts of it. Its proponents (such as Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī) argue that ibāḥah and nadb are a ḥaqīqah qāṣirah, since their definitions form part of the definition of wujūb:

Wujūb is the permissibility to do an action and the prohibition of leaving it out.

Ibāḥah is the permissibility to do an action.

Nadb is the permissibility to do an action with preference for doing it.

All three include the permissibility to do the action, so on this view amr may imply ibāḥah and nadb intrinsically.

The opposing view holds that ibāḥah and nadb are not implied ḥaqīqatan but majāzan, since each strays from the original meaning of wujūb:

Wujūb is the permissibility to do an action and the prohibition of leaving it out.

Ibāḥah is the permissibility to do an action with permissibility to leave it out.

Nadb is the permissibility to do an action with preference for doing it and with permissibility to leave it out.

The definition of wujūb prohibits leaving the action, while the other two permit its omission; the disparity between the definitions is plain.

Footnotes

1. Qurʾān 24:33 ↩

2. Qurʾān 5:2 ↩

3. Qurʾān 5:2 ↩

4. Qurʾān 9:5 ↩

5. Qurʾān 33:36 ↩

6. Qurʾān 7:12 ↩

7. Qurʾān 24:63 ↩