Among the important matters is the knowledge of al-jarḥ and al-taʿdīl. These may proceed by examining the narrator's condition in religion, his observance of the obligatory acts, his abstention from sins, and the like, or by examining his ḥadīth in particular: what he transmits, what others corroborate, what they contradict and what he is alone in transmitting. The first of these is expressed by the term ʿadāla, the second by the term ḍabṭ. If the two bear upon ʿadāla,1 then jarḥ in the matter is accepted only when it is explained by something that counts as jarḥ by agreement, whether it comes from a scholar or from someone else.23
Taʿdīl is accepted in general, unspecified form, because requiring an explanation would oblige the one praising to enumerate all matters of religion, both commands and prohibitions, which is impractical, unlike the case of jarḥ.
When jarḥ and taʿdīl meet on the question of ʿadāla, jarḥ is given precedence;4 the one praising reports what is apparent in the narrator's condition, while the one criticising reports what was hidden from the one praising.5
If, however, jarḥ and taʿdīl concern ḍabṭ and ḥifẓ,6 then they are accepted only from someone well-versed in the field, and explanation is not a precondition for either. In questions of ḍabṭ, jarḥ is not given precedence over taʿdīl: the one praising may have a fuller acquaintance with the narrator's aḥādīth than the one criticising does.7
Note that a narrator needs tazkiya (declaration of trustworthiness) only when he is not already well known for ʿadāla and acceptance and his condition is uncertain or unclear. As for those whose ʿadāla is established among the scholars and whose names are widely accompanied by praise, no tazkiya is required for them, such as the four Imāms and their peers, and this is why ʿAllāmah al-Dhahabī did not include them in his Mīzān.8
Such as their saying in taʿdīl: "ʿadl" (upright); and in jarḥ: "fāsiq" (impious). This is because the scholars differ over what counts as a cause of fisq, such as nikāḥ al-mutʿa (temporary marriage), approaching wives from behind, and the like. Imām al-Shāfiʿī alerts to this in al-Umm, 7/508; ʿAllāmah al-Khaṭīb cites it in al-Kifāya, p. 143, on the authority of al-Qāḍī Abū al-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī. And Allāh knows best. ↩
This is because criticism may be accepted from someone who is not a scholar. For example, suppose an upright man who is not a scholar says, "This is my neighbour, and I know that he steals." His criticism is accepted; it is not rejected merely on the grounds that he is a layman, since being a scholar is not a precondition when the criticism concerns ʿadāla and matters of religion. ↩
The masāʾil in this section are stated without the qualifications the specialists attach to them, above all on whether jarḥ takes precedence over taʿdīl. ʿAllāmah ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī gives three positions on a narrator whom some criticise and others declare upright: that jarḥ prevails absolutely, that taʿdīl prevails where those declaring him upright are more numerous, and that the two conflict, so that neither prevails without a tiebreaker (al-Rafʿ waʾl-Takmīl fī al-Jarḥ wa-l-Taʿdīl, ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghuddah, pp. 114 to 117). Shaykh ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghuddah observes that these arise only where neither the jarḥ nor the taʿdīl is itself vitiated, a jarḥ springing from anger being no real conflict (p. 114), and that many scholars of his day erred in taking any jarḥ from any critic to override any taʿdīl from any authority: the precedence holds only where the jarḥ is mufassar, explained, an unexplained jarḥ being inadmissible outright and unable even to conflict with a taʿdīl (p. 117). He cites al-Suyūṭī, Ibn Ḥajar and al-Sakhāwī to the same effect, and concludes that where both are unexplained, or the jarḥ alone is, taʿdīl prevails (pp. 118 to 120). [tr.] ↩
The maxim is not absolute, in the judgement of Shaykh Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Khalīl (al-Mukhtaṣar min ʿUlūm Ahl al-Athar, pp. 104 to 107). It became current from ʿAllāmah al-Khaṭīb's stating it in al-Kifāya, but it belongs to the chapter of shahāda, testimony, which rests on what is seen at first hand, and not to riwāya, which rests on ijtihād; later writers repeated it after him in taqlīd, and so it grew famous (p. 106). Where jarḥ and taʿdīl genuinely conflict and cannot be reconciled, one is preferred by external evidence and other indications, and no invariable rule governs which (pp. 105 to 106). His conclusion: the maxim holds in testimony taken broadly, "whereas in the chapter of narration it is restricted to a jarḥ that is established and outweighs the taʿdīl by other indications, or in view of the principles and norms of the discipline. This is the reality of this famous rule, which escaped many of the later scholars" «وأما في باب الرواية فهو مقيد بما ثبت فيه الجرح ورجح على التعديل بالقرائن الأخرى أو نظرًا إلى أصول الفن وضوابطه. هذه هي حقيقة هذه القاعدة المشهورة التي خفيت على كثير من المتأخرين» (p. 107). Both jarḥ and taʿdīl he takes to be accepted whether left unexplained or given with cause, provided the one giving them is qualified (p. 104). [tr.] ↩
For example, a wife mentioning that her husband drinks at home, since this is not visible to those outside. [tr.] ↩
For example, in taʿdīl: "ḥāfiẓ" (preserver), "ḍābiṭ" (precise), "mutqin" (accurate), "ṣadūq" (very truthful), "lā baʾsa bihi" (no harm in him), or "ṣāliḥ al-ḥadīth" (his ḥadīth is good); and in jarḥ: "waḍḍāʿ" (a forger), "muttaham bi-l-waḍʿ" (suspected of forgery), "matrūk al-ḥadīth" (whose ḥadīth is left aside), "mardūd al-ḥadīth" (whose ḥadīth is rejected), "dhāhib al-ḥadīth" (whose ḥadīth is gone), "ḍaʿīf" (weak), "layyin al-ḥadīth" (soft in ḥadīth), or "laysa bi-qawiyy" (not strong); and the like. ↩
Drawn from al-Kifāya, the chapter on "what is known to lay people regarding the qualities of a transmitter whose ḥadīth may be accepted, and what is known only to the learned", pp. 122 to 123. I say: through this distinction drawn by ʿAllāmah al-Khaṭīb, all the difficulties surrounding this discussion are resolved. The later scholars in general did not draw the distinction, and as a result their statements on the question wavered in several places. And Allāh knows best. ↩
See: al-Kifāya, pp. 114 to 115; Mīzān al-Iʿtidāl, 1/2. ↩
Al-shādhdh is what a single narrator transmits alone, raising doubt in the mind of the critic; this is also al-munkar, and the muḥaddithūn treat the two as one.
The Ḥanafīs classify narrators by ʿadāla, ḍabṭ and fiqh, with the mastūr as a disputed third category and the majhūl, whose narration falls into five cases
Four positions on whether jarḥ and taʿdīl follow the rules of khabar or of testimony, with the additional requirement that the evaluator be ʿadl and unbiased.
The threefold division of ḥadīth study: ʿilm riwāyat al-ḥadīth, ʿilm dirāyat al-ḥadīth and ʿilm uṣūl al-ḥadīth (muṣṭalaḥ al-ḥadīth), as set out in the opening of al-Mulakhkhaṣ.
